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GRADUATED SOVEREIGNTY AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE GAPS: 




Illicit trade in tobacco products has been a significant problem globally for many years.  It allows 
cigarettes to be sold far below their legal price and thus contributes to higher consumption, 
morbidity and mortality, and deprives state treasuries of a substantial amount of revenue. This 
article identifies special economic zones (SEZs), particularly free trade zones, as a key conduit for this 
illicit trade. The development of SEZs as weak points in the global governance architecture is 
explained with reference to the concept of ‘graduated sovereignty’, whereby the uniform 
management of territory by modern states has given way to a more spatially selective form of 
territorial governance, in which some slices of territory are more fully integrated into the world 
economy than others via various forms of differential regulation. Attempts to comprehensively 
(re)regulate SEZs, in the face of growing evidence of the dysfunctionalities that they can engender, 
have so far been unsuccessful. It is concluded that the neo-liberal global economy has facilitated a 
regulatory ‘race to the bottom’, a problem that can only ultimately be overcome by international 
negotiation and agreement.  
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Illicit trade in tobacco products, usually cigarettes, has been a significant problem globally for many 
years, both in terms of its impacts on public health and state revenues. One of the most effective 
means of reducing tobacco consumption, and therefore the disease burden caused by it, is by raising 
the sale price through taxation (Chaloupka et al, 2000). Nearly all countries impose excise tax and 
sales or value added tax (VAT) on tobacco products and many apply high import tariffs, so the 
difference between the tax free price and the tax inclusive price can be substantial (Yurekli and 
Sayginsoy, 2010, p. 549). Smuggling allows cigarettes to be sold far below their legal price and thus 
contributes to higher consumption, morbidity and mortality (Chaloupka et al, 2000). It also deprives 
state treasuries of a substantial amount of revenue.  
The extent of cigarette smuggling is difficult to calculate because smuggling routes are extremely 
complex and data is limited (Yurekli and Sayginsoy, 2010, p. 546), yet all estimates agree that it is a 
sizeable problem. The best and most recent estimate puts the extent of the illicit trade globally at 
11.6% of total consumption, although this can vary between countries from just 1% at its lowest to 
40-50% at its highest (Joossens et al, 2010, p. 1645-1646). This equates to a total revenue loss 
globally of about $40.5 billion a year (Joossens et al, 2010, p. 1645). If this illicit trade were 
eliminated, because average prices would rise as a result and consumption would therefore decline, 
governments would gain at least $31.3 billion a year and 164,000 premature deaths a year would be 
avoided (Joossens et al, 2010, p. 1645). So serious is the problem of cigarette smuggling that in 2012 
the States Parties to the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control (FCTC) adopted a Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (hereafter ‘the WHO 




Smuggling usually involves hub or transit locations where huge volumes of cigarettes are imported 
solely to be re-exported (Joossens and Raw, 1998; Yurekli and Sayginsoy, 2010). While economic 
theory suggests that smuggling and other forms of illicit trade result from price (and therefore tax) 
differentials between different jurisdictions, empirical studies demonstrate the importance of 
governance arrangements. For example, higher levels of corruption are associated with weaker law 
enforcement and higher smuggling (Yurekli and Sayginsoy, 2010, p. 553). Merriman et al (2000) find 
that the perceived level of corruption in a country statistically explains more of the variance in 
estimates of cigarette smuggling than do price differentials. In fact, research shows that it is not 
usually cheap cigarettes that are smuggled into high price markets, but the opposite, with 
opportunities to evade duties the explanatory factor (Joossens and Raw, 1998, p. 67-8; Joossens et 
al, 2010, p. 1646). In addition to the differences between duty free and duty paid prices, therefore, 
the magnitude of the illicit trade in tobacco products can be explained by factors relating to the 
governance arrangements within and at the borders of jurisdictions and the legal regime that 
governs how products are traded between those jurisdictions.  
The legal regime governing trade between jurisdictions has been exploited by the use of complex 
smuggling routes designed to confuse authorities and hide the true destination of the product. 
Products destined for export from one jurisdiction to another are exempt from taxes, including 
customs duties, excise tax and VAT, while they are in ‘transit’. Tax is only required to be paid within 
the jurisdiction where final sale is intended to occur, so products passing through a third jurisdiction 
remain legally untaxed. Cigarettes are thus sold by manufacturers to suppliers and then shipped 
from one destination to another, often changing hands on many occasions (Joossens et al, 2000). 
Smuggling takes place when all or a portion of the product is diverted into the illegal market and sold 
without taxes having been paid. The final locus of the illicit sale can be anywhere in the world, 




Illicit trade thus takes place where there are 'weak points' in local, national or global structures of 
governance, particularly where borders are compromised for one reason or another. Once large 
scale illicit trade takes hold, the potential profits associated with it provide incentives for organised 
crime networks to develop, and can lead to increases in corruption and higher-risk criminal activity 
supported by these profits (Joosens et al, 2000). Weak governance may exist as a result of state 
failures and lack of capacity, but may also arise where governments have chosen to  govern parts of 
their territory in a differentiated or graduated manner, as in the case of special economic zones 
(SEZs), potentially resulting in the (de jure or de facto) loosening of border controls or other 
regulations. 
This article analyses the role of SEZs in the illicit tobacco trade and theorises it with reference to 
literature concerning the growing political and spatial complexity of governance arrangements under 
contemporary forms of globalisation. It draws particularly on Ong’s concept of ‘graduated 
sovereignty’ (Ong, 2000; 2006) and Agnew’s (2009) development of Mann’s (1984) concept of 
‘infrastructural power’. It is argued that spatially selective forms of territorial governance such as 
SEZs can create ‘gaps’ in governance that facilitate illicit trade. The next section presents an 
extended discussion of these concepts. Subsequently, I discuss examples of how various SEZs have 
facilitated the illicit trade in tobacco products. Finally, I analyse the difficulties of effective 
regulation, or re-regulation, of SEZs, and the trade-offs that governments face when balancing 
effective regulation with the economic imperative of increasing competitiveness within a globalised 
world market.  
 
GRADUATED SOVEREIGNTY AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE GAPS 
As Walker (1998, p. 356) observes, the concept of sovereignty ‘was introduced into legal and 




or as Hirst and Thompson (1999, p. 256) put it, ‘“sovereignty” in its modern form is a highly 
distinctive political claim – to exclusive control of a definite territory.’ Sovereignty implies control 
over both specific areas of territory and particular functions and so ‘tends to be restricted by 
boundaries of space and subject matter’ (Walker, 1998, p. 356). This identification of sovereignty 
with control of a specific territory implies that sovereignty has been exercised ‘uniformly within a 
given territory’ (Pauly and Grande, 2005, p. 8).  
Yet, as Pauly and Grande note (2005, p. 8), empirical investigation indicates that the ‘practices, 
expression, and even theoretical conceptualisation’ of sovereignty have been subject to change 
historically. Indeed, they argue that ‘the idea that sovereignty can be divided and reconfigured is… 
one of the most important innovations in modern political philosophy’ (Pauly and Grande, 2005, p. 
11). While issues concerning the locus of sovereignty have always been inherent in federal polities, 
the distribution of powers between levels of government is usually specified by a constitution and 
related to particular territorial states (Watts, 1998). Contemporary discussions of the divisibility of 
sovereignty go beyond this, noting, as Ruggie (1993) does, that state territory can be ‘unbundled’.  
Agnew (1994; 2009), for example, has been one of the foremost critics of ‘sovereignty myths’, 
particularly the assumptions that state sovereignty is congruent with both a specific ‘nation’ and 
with a defined territory. Drawing on the work of Michael Mann (1984), Agnew (2009, p. 117) 
highlights the distinction between what Mann calls ‘despotic’ and ‘infrastructural’ power, linked 
respectively to ‘the two different functions that states perform…: (1) the struggle for power among 
elites and interest groups in one state and between those and elites and interest groups in other 
states and (2) the provision of public goods that are usually provided publicly (by states).’ Until 
recently, argues Agnew (2009, p. 118), the provision of infrastructural goods had a largely territorial 
basis, since the populations benefiting from them were concentrated territorially and the 
technologies for providing them ‘had a built-in territorial bias, not least relating to the capture of 
positive externalities.’ However, it is increasingly the case that ‘Infrastructural power can be 




the externality fields that they produce… New deployments of infrastructural power both de-
territorialise existing states and re-territorialise membership around cities and hinterlands, regions, 
and continental-level political entities such as the European Union’ (Agnew, 2009, p. 118).  
Pauly and Grande (2005, p. 15) argue that as a result of such processes sovereignty arrangements 
have become increasingly complex, leading to ‘multiple and overlapping hierarchies’ in a system of 
‘complex sovereignty’. In this new situation, ‘territoriality still matters’, but political authority has 
been reconfigured across various functional dimensions and spatial scales (Pauly and Grande, 2005, 
p.15). These developments have been associated particularly with processes of globalisation. Cerny 
(1998, p. 36), for example, argues that globalisation is ‘leading to an unbundling of basic state 
functions and the growth of uneven, cross-cutting and overlapping levels of governance and quasi-
governance, the fragmentation of cultural identities and the reconfiguration of social, economic and 
political spaces’ (see also Cerny, 2010a). According to Grande and Pauly (2005, p. 286), we are 
beginning to see a transcendence of ‘the traditional separations of domestic and international 
politics, inside-outside and public-private’.  
Hirst and Thompson (1999, p. 268-269) too note that ‘Politics is becoming more polycentric, with 
states as merely one level in a complex system of overlapping and often competing agencies of 
governance’. In many cases, power has been ceded ‘upwards’ to supranational organisations or 
‘downwards’ to sub-national units (Hirst and Thompson, 1999, p. 270). In relation to the latter, 
Keating (2001, p. 53) observes how various strategies for ‘territorial management’, used by states in 
the past to integrate disparate groups and ensure the integrity of their territories, ‘have been 
undermined by the decreased capacity of national states to deliver the goods.’ In a globalised 
economy, states find it difficult to manage the various interests within their borders to the same 
extent as previously, leading to them decentralising some functions or decision making powers, but 
also ‘favour[ing] their most competitive regions and sectors’ (Keating, 2001, p. 53). Sidaway (2007a, 




with a partial decoupling of ‘nation’ and ‘development’, ‘embodied in subtly reworked articulations 
between territory, accumulation/development and sovereignty.’   
There is not simply a uniform ceding upwards or downwards of powers by the state, but rather these 
powers may be applied differentially to different places and population groups, including within the 
territory of the state. Sidaway (2007b, p. 332), for example, notes how a variety of ‘enclave spaces’ 
are ‘governed by a range of legal norms and bounded in an array of formal and informal means that 
frequently cut-across established state boundaries.’ Jones (1997, p. 849) argues that states have a 
tendency to ‘privilege certain places’ through accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects, a 
process he calls ‘spatial selectivity’. Such selectivity may involve ‘high degrees of institutional and 
policy experimentation’, the particular forms of such experimentation varying depending on the 
mobilisation of interest groups and social forces (Jones, 1997, p.832). Various forms of SEZ have 
been the sites for such experimentation (Doucette and Lee, 2015).  
Ong (2000) calls this differential treatment of populations and places by states ‘graduated 
sovereignty’, a concept she articulates as ‘a product of state-globalisation interactions’ (Ong, 2000, 
p. 57). The term ‘graduated sovereignty’ is used to refer to ‘the effects of a flexible management of 
sovereignty, as governments adjust political space to the dictates of global capital… “graduated 
sovereignty” is an effect of states moving from being administrators of a watertight national entity 
to regulators of diverse spaces and populations that link with global markets.’ (Ong, 2006, p. 78) This 
‘flexible management of sovereignty’ is typified by the creation of SEZs, which can ‘vary in their mix 
of legal protections, controls and repressive regimes’ (2000, p. 66). Such flexibilities include the 
provision of on-site infrastructure for transnational corporations (TNCs), tax breaks and special 
import-export allowances, as well as informal understandings with corporations, whereby union 
activities are suppressed or forms of corporate disciplining are permitted. Different types of SEZ 
offer different types and degrees of flexibility, and comprise a ‘galaxy of differentiated zones’ which 




‘proliferation of differentiated sovereignty within and across borders’ (Ong, 2000, p. 68-69). Rather 
than being uniform then, state sovereignty is graduated into a ‘flexible set of state strategies that 
are not congruent with the national space itself, but are attuned to the workings of global markets’ 
(Ong, 2000, p. 72).  
The concept of graduated sovereignty, then, allows us to understand better those instances where 
the state chooses to govern a territory in a differentiated manner, while Agnew’s (building on 
Mann’s) distinction between despotic and infrastructural power provides a further analytical lens. 
While Agnew (2009) shows that infrastructural power can be extended beyond the territory of the 
state, via currency arrangements, for example, examination of SEZs demonstrates that 
infrastructural power can be selectively implemented in a designated slice of a state’s territory and 
made available (sometimes exclusively) to external actors. Easterling (2014, p. 35), for example, 
notes how TNCs benefit from various subsidised infrastructure investments at the same time that 
they are exempt from taxation. Such infrastructural inducements are often presented according to a 
common formula, as states compete to attract capital (Easterling, 2014, p. 31). Control within SEZs is 
often exercised by bespoke authorities that are distinct from central or local governments, and 
increasingly zone governance is handed to private corporations or public-private partnerships, in a 
further unbundling of sovereignty as functions are contracted out to the private sector (Easterling, 
2014, p. 34; World Bank, 2008).  
Nevertheless, despite selective deregulation, SEZs may involve various forms of disciplinary 
supervision, especially for workers (Easterling, 2014, p. 54). While SEZs have market-building goals, 
their governance may involve authoritarian rather than liberal forms (Zhang, 2012). This is a 
particular issue in export processing zones, some of which explicitly deny the right to freedom of 
association, and others of which make an unstated bargain with TNCs not to enforce what labour 
regulations formally exist (McCallum, 2011, p. 4). Excessive and compulsory overtime, poor health 




organisers have all been reported in such zones (McCallum, 2011, p.4). The forms of mobility 
available to workers in and around SEZs often contrast with the globally agile movement of goods 
and capital, with (often predominantly female) workers facing a stark choice between rural poverty 
and regimented conditions, such as those in some Chinese zones, for example (Ngai, 2004). In some 
cases, such as that of India, zone development has depended on forcible land dispossession (Levien, 
2011).  
Yet such spatial strategies are not the result of states simply imposing their will on society or of them 
merely responding to the needs of transnational capital in a mechanistic way (Jones, 1997; Park, 
2005). Rather, the state can be seen as a site of contestation between various actors and social 
forces, both ‘external’ to, or ‘above’ it and ‘internal’ to, or ‘below’ it (Glassman, 1999; Park, 2005; 
Cerny, 2010b). Thus in Korea, the sites and the forms of ‘spatially selective liberalisation’ through 
SEZs was determined by struggle and compromise between conflicting interests and ideas, in this 
case those that favoured the inherited institutional frameworks of the ‘developmental state’ and 
those favouring economic liberalisation (Park, 2005). In Dubai, the construction and development of 
the Jebel Ali Free Trade Zone was the outcome of negotiated relationships between the Emirate’s 
government, the neighbouring emirates that formed the United Arab Emirates, British imperial 
interests and local and foreign businesses (Keshavarzian, 2010).  
The complexity of these new forms of governance means that both the willingness and the ability of 
states and the various jurisdictions to cooperate with each other are crucial to ensuring effective 
governance (Grande and Pauly, 2005, p. 294). In the best case scenario, we would see what Beck 
(2005) calls ‘transnational cooperation states’ acting in concert with each other to ensure new 
modes of collective problem-solving, in which ‘different levels of governance are institutionally 
differentiated and yet integrated’ (Grande and Pauly, 2005, p. 288). Yet, the potential problem with 
such complex and differentiated forms of governance, as Hirst and Thompson (1999, p. 269) identify, 




coherent manner, ‘then the unscrupulous can exploit and the unlucky can fall into the “gaps” 
between different agencies and dimensions of governance.’ If the various governing powers at 
different levels are not ‘sutured’ together, ‘then these gaps will lead to the corrosion of governance 
at every level’ (Hirst and Thompson, 1999, p. 269-270).  
Furthermore, dominant forms of neo-liberal globalisation have been fundamentally associated not 
with cooperation but with competition. Peck and Tickell (1994), for example, argue that the 
‘institutional searching’ that globalisation processes have given rise to is leading not to a new 
‘institutional fix’, but rather a ‘regulatory vacuum’ in which policies such as the implementation of 
SEZs represent the ‘selling [of] the local to the global’. The result is ‘the jungle law of neoliberalism’, 
in which localities are pitched into a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ competitive race to the bottom. Cerny 
(1998, p. 49) argues that there is an emerging ‘governance gap’, as ‘multilayered and asymmetric’ 
structures give rise to ‘increasingly suboptimal outcomes’. In such a situation, there are likely to be 
new ‘organisational opportunities… for those operating more or less “outside the law”’, including 
drugs traders, mafia and those populations that have been marginalised or excluded (Cerny, 1998, p. 
57). The largest problem in this regard, Cerny argues (1998, p. 57-58), ‘is where different dimensions 
of extra-legal activities intersect with legal or quasi-legal ones’, potentially leading to a 
‘transnationalised black economy’. Nordstrom (2000, p. 36), too, notes how extensive networks that 
‘cross various divides between legal, quasi-legal, gray markets and downright illegal activities’ have 
become internationalized and may themselves challenge the legitimacy and sovereignty of the state. 
The next section investigates these issues further by examining the governance of SEZs and their 
vulnerabilities to crime in general, and to the illicit trade in tobacco products in particular.   
 
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES AND ILLICIT TRADE 
Evidence that some SEZs, particularly free trade zones or ‘free zones’, have been a conduit for illicit 




specifically with free zones. However, the nature of the phenomenon necessarily means that it is 
difficult to research and that evidence is fragmented and incomplete. Evidence is often based on 
customs seizures, not always in the SEZ or jurisdiction via which the products have first been 
smuggled, but often once they have been transported to another jurisdiction. Customs seizure data 
is collated by the World Customs Organisation (WCO) and discussed in publications by that and 
other international organisations.  As an observer at sessions of the International Negotiating Body 
for the WHO Protocol in 2008 and 2010, it was clear to the author of this article that the 
vulnerabilities of zones to the illicit tobacco trade is widely accepted within the customs and public 
health policy-making communities, yet few attempts have been made either to synthesise existing 
knowledge of this phenomenon or to theorise it.  
Evidence relating to the vulnerabilities of various kinds of zones to illicit activity in general, to illicit 
trade in tobacco products in particular, and to the role of specific zones in the latter was therefore 
collated from a number of published sources. Much of this evidence is published by international 
organisations, including both intergovernmental and business organisations. The websites of these 
organisations were therefore searched using the following terms: ‘special economic zones’, ‘free 
zones’, ‘illicit trade’ and ‘tobacco’. A snowballing strategy was used whereby relevant references to 
additional organisations or specific publications in retrieved documents were followed up. Relevant 
documents are cited below and include those of the following organisations: the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), Euromonitor, the European Commission, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the US Library of 
Congress, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), The World Bank, the WCO, the World Economic Forum (WEF), 
the WHO, and the World Trade  Organisation (WTO).  
Reports by these organisations were supplemented by relevant academic articles. Press reports 




However, given the difficulty of substantiating such reports, where journalistic sources were used, 
precedence was given to the work of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), 
which has a reliable track record of investigative reporting of the illicit trade in tobacco products. 
Much of the work of the ICIJ and of cited academic articles is based on analysis of internal tobacco 
industry documents available online from the Truth Tobacco Industry Documents 
(https://www.industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/). These documents, currently 
encompassing approximately 88 million pages in 14.6 million documents relating to all aspects of 
tobacco industry activity, were made available to the public as a result of legal settlements reached 
in 1998 between US states and tobacco companies, which compelled the companies to release 
documents filed in discovery in contemporary and future US lawsuits. A discussion of the 
provenance, scope and limitations of these internal industry documents can be found in MacKenzie 
and Holden (2016). 
International organisations will have their own agendas and it is appropriate to identify these. 
Relevant reports may not be concerned solely with the illicit trade in tobacco products. The FATF, for 
example, which was a creation of the G7, has primarily been concerned to understand and combat 
money laundering processes and, since 2001, terrorist financing. Similarly, organisations such as the 
WCO and the UNODC are concerned with all illicit trade rather than simply that in tobacco products. 
The evidence reviewed below indicates that illicit trade in tobacco products is often part of wider 
patterns of criminal activity also involving narcotics and money laundering. A discussion of the 
limitations of business sources is given when discussing these in the next section.  
The World Bank (2008, p. 2) defines SEZs as ‘geographically delimited areas administered by a single 
body, offering certain incentives… to businesses which physically locate within the zone.’ SEZs are 
often described as ‘deterritorialised’, that is, they are not treated as part of the territory of the state 
within which they are located. Domestic regulations relating to any type and combination of 




may actively choose to establish such zones as part of a strategy to attract foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and gain competitive advantage, or they may do so at the behest of international organisations 
such as the World Bank and IMF. The number of new zones increased rapidly from the 1980s, with 
176 zones in 47 countries in 1986 growing to 3,500 zones in 130 countries in 2006 (Farole, 2011, p. 
1). The World Bank (2008, p. 3) identifies a number of different types of zone, as follows: 
 Free trade zones (also known as commercial free zones) are fenced-in, duty-free areas, offering 
warehousing, storage, and distribution facilities for trade, trans-shipment, and re-export 
operations.  
 Export processing zones are industrial estates aimed primarily at foreign markets. Hybrid EPZs 
are typically sub-divided into a general zone open to all industries and a separate EPZ area 
reserved for export-oriented, EPZ-registered enterprises. 
 Enterprise zones are intended to revitalize distressed urban or rural areas through the provision 
of tax incentives and financial grants. 
 Freeports typically encompass much larger areas. They accommodate all types of activities, 
including tourism and retail sales, permit on-site residence, and provide a broader set of 
incentives and benefits. 
 Single factory EPZ schemes provide incentives to individual enterprises regardless of location; 
factories do not have to locate within a designated zone to receive incentives and privileges. 
 Specialized zones include science/technology parks, petrochemical zones, logistics parks, airport-
based zones, and so on. 
Various of these different types of zone may be utilised by those engaged in illicit trade, depending 
on the specific form of illicit activity and the specific incentives offered by the zone, but free trade 




For example, various free zones have been accused of acting as centres for money laundering. A 
report by the FATF (2010, p.4) notes that ‘the same characteristics that make FTZs attractive to 
legitimate business also attract abuse by illicit actors’. The report identifies a number of ‘systemic 
weaknesses’ that make zones vulnerable to such abuse, including inadequate anti-money laundering 
safeguards; relaxed oversight by competent domestic authorities; weak procedures to inspect goods 
and register legal entities; and lack of adequate coordination between zone and customs authorities 
(FATF, 2010, p. 4).  
In general, it is possible to identify two distinct types of illicit trade in tobacco products via SEZs, 
which may overlap and which are discussed in more detail below: smuggling via SEZs, most often 
free zones, and illicit manufacture within zones themselves. Trans-shipment, whereby goods are 
transferred from an importing means of transport to an exporting means of transport and perhaps 
thereby to a third party, has been identified as a particular problem in relation to smuggling via free 
zones (WCO, 2013, p. 9). As Friman and Andreas (1999, p. 11) point out, the global expansion of licit 
trade has expanded ‘the pipelines within which illicit flows can hide’, so that trans-shipment of illicit 
goods ‘has surged with globalisation’. Chalfin (2006, p. 253) has noted how the development of new 
forms of information technology in customs procedures has moved the form of shipment monitoring 
from physical checks to documentary data collection and analysis, in the process ‘decoupling… state 
authority from the usual territorial limits and foundations of its expression.’ While in itself this 
represents a change in the form rather than the capacity of state monitoring, designed to facilitate 
the speedy and seamless flow of goods between places, it can be problematic in free zones, which 
are designed to act as trans-shipment hubs. Documents may be forged, physical checks harder to 
implement, and zone authorities may not accept the jurisdiction of customs authorities. According to 
the WCO (2013, p. 9): 
Trans-shipments via Free Zones are of particular concern to Customs administrations 




security risks. Consistent with the purposes of Free Zones, goods introduced into these areas 
are, in many jurisdictions, not subject to Customs controls… Without a seamless traceability 
of the transport chain… and [in] the absence of appropriate control mechanisms, it is not 
possible to meet the [standards of the WCO and prevent smuggling]. 
The FATF (2010, p. 17) specifically identifies cigarettes as items that are vulnerable to smuggling via 
free zones because of the high volume of containers, the ease of repackaging and relabelling and the 
general lack of oversight.  
The second main form of illicit activity – manufacture within zones - reflects an apparent shift more 
recently towards the smuggling of cigarettes that have been produced for the primary purpose of 
illegal trade rather than the genuine brands produced by transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) 
(Holden, 2016). Cigarettes manufactured intentionally for illicit trade include counterfeits of TTCs’ 
brands and ‘illicit whites’, i.e. cigarettes that may be produced legally within the jurisdiction of 
manufacture, but which are intended mainly or solely for illicit sale in other jurisdictions (Joossens 
and Raw, 2012). The OECD, among others, has identified zones as manufacturing and distribution 
bases for counterfeit products (OECD, 2008, p. 85-86). The rest of this section examines a number of 
particular cases of SEZs where there is significant evidence of illicit trade in tobacco products, 
dealing in turn with smuggling via free zones and illicit manufacture within zones. Given the 
inherently limited nature of the evidence referred to above, these examples are not intended to be 
exhaustive, but rather to illustrate the nature of the illicit trade that may take place via SEZs.  
 
Smuggling Via Zones 
One of the most widely reported cases of cigarette smuggling via a free zone is that of Aruba during 
the 1990s. A number of previous analyses have documented the apparent complicity of TTCs in 




2004; Lee and Collin, 2006; Le Gresley et al, 2008). The Aruba Free Zone was a central hub in the 
illicit trade in Latin America during the 1990s, with TTCs routing their products via the zone on their 
way to various end markets. For example, evidence from internal tobacco industry documents 
suggests that British American Tobacco (BAT) was complicit in a scheme that saw its cigarettes 
exported from Venezuela to Aruba, only for them to be illegally shipped back via Colombia to 
Venezuela for sale on the country’s black market (Holden et al, 2010). Similarly, both BAT and Philip 
Morris have been accused of participating in schemes whereby their cigarettes were shipped via 
Aruban or Panamanian free zones and then into Colombia’s special customs zone Maicao for illegal 
sale (Ronderos, 2001). Some of this illicit activity appears to have related to the money laundering of 
illicit drug profits, notably via the ‘black market peso exchange’. In this scheme, money earned from 
drug sales in the United States would be used to purchase cigarettes, alcohol and household goods 
which were then exported to Colombia and other Latin American countries and sold for pesos 
(Ronderos, 2001). Cigarette smuggling presents an ideal opportunity for money launderers, given 
the product’s low weight, high relative market value and often low penalties if caught (Marsden et 
al, 2001). In 2000, a number of Colombian Departments (i.e. states) filed legal action against BAT and 
Philip Morris in the United States under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organisations Act 
(RICO) (Beelman, 2000; Ronderos, 2001; Gillespie, 2003), although the action ultimately failed since 
the US court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction. 
Another free zone in Latin America that evidence suggests has been a major transit route for the 
illicit tobacco trade is the Colon Free Zone (CFZ) in Panama. The CFZ is the second largest free zone 
in the world after Hong Kong and is crucial to Panama’s economy, handling imports and re-exports 
equalling 7.5% of national gross domestic product in 2012 (WTO, p. 71). The zone hosts around 
3,000 companies and provides direct employment for 30,000 people, with another 5,000 employed 
indirectly (WTO, p. 72). The zone was a key conduit for cigarette smuggling during the 1990s 
(Ronderos, 2001) and, evidence suggests, continues to be so for illicit goods of all kinds (Bate, 2013). 




illicit drug trade and money laundering (Ronderos, 2001; Marsden et al, 2001). Panama is also a key 
‘offshore’ financial centre, comprising ‘the largest and arguably most important international 
banking centre in Latin America’ (Warf, 2002, p. 36). Trade via the CFZ is a significant source of 
earnings for these banks, given its credit-driven nature. As one of the key architects of Panama’s 
offshore banking centre has stated, ‘the Free Trade Zone and the banking system are totally 
symbiotic’ (quoted in Warf, 2002, p. 38). In April 2016, Panama’s role as an offshore financial centre 
received renewed attention following the leaking of the ‘Panama Papers’, a set of 11.5 million files 
from the Panama-based law firm Mossack Fonseca (Harding, 2016). According to the CIA (2015), 
Panama is a ‘major cocaine trans-shipment point and primary money-laundering centre for narcotics 
revenue; money-laundering activity is especially heavy in the Colon Free Zone’. Although the 
government has made some attempt to tighten anti-money laundering rules in recent years, the 
FATF and the IMF identify several remaining problems (IMF, 2014; Lawrence, 2015). While goods 
and money flow easily through Panama, Sigler (2014, p. 11) notes that the CFZ and the newer 
Panama Pacifico zone are poorly integrated with the surrounding areas, might exacerbate inequality, 
and erect ‘barriers to entry (both physical and social) to the majority of Panamanian society.’ 
A number of other SEZs have been accused of acting as hubs for the illicit trade in tobacco products. 
Among those specifically identified as conduits for cigarette smuggling are the free zone of Ciudad 
del Este in the Tri-Border Area between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina (Hudson, 2010, p. 59); 
Belize’s Corozal Free Zone (Cawley, 2013); the Subic Bay Freeport Zone and other zones in the 
Philippines (Asia Sentinel, 2012); the Xiamen SEZ, which was at the centre of one of the biggest 
smuggling and corruption cases in China’s history (Shieh, 2005); and Dubai’s Jebel Ali FTZ, discussed 
below. However, it is not only zones in low and middle income countries that are vulnerable to 
smuggling. US ‘foreign trade zones’ were a key transit point in cigarette smuggling operations in the 
1990s, whereby tobacco companies exported cigarettes from Canada to the US zones, from where 
they were smuggled back into Canada (Beare, 2002, p. 237; Holden, 2016, p. 104). Similarly, illicit 




cigarettes smoked between 2007 and 2012, with the main pathway into Spain appearing to be the 
Canary Islands (Euromonitor, 2013, p. 39). The Canary Islands operates a ‘special zone’ providing for 
a series of tax advantages and a free trade zone (ZEC, 2015).  
 
Manufacture Within Zones 
Increasingly, illicitly traded cigarettes are manufactured within SEZs, rather than simply being routed 
through them for the purpose of trans-shipment and tax evasion. This reflects the apparent shift in 
the overall nature of the illicit trade in tobacco products towards the manufacture of counterfeits of 
TTCs’ brands and the sale of ‘illicit whites’ (Joossens and Raw, 2012). A key example of the latter is 
the Jin Ling brand, which is produced in the Russian exclave and SEZ of Kaliningrad and sold widely 
throughout Europe, but which appears to have no legal market in any European country (Candea et 
al, 2009a). There has been a sustained growth of the smuggling of Jin Ling cigarettes into the EU 
since 2005, estimated to cause revenue losses of €700 million per annum (European Commission, 
2011, p. 16). Wedged between Poland and Lithuania, Kaliningrad was given SEZ status in 1991 with 
the break-up of the Soviet Union (Vinokurov, 2004; 2007). At the beginning of the 2000s, 
Kaliningrad’s ‘grey’ or ‘shadow’ economy (consisting of ‘informal’ activities where there may be lack 
of adherence to legislation; ‘hidden’ activities where taxes and other payments are avoided; and 
‘illegal’ activities that are specifically prohibited by law) was estimated to constitute approximately 
one third of its total gross regional product (GRP), although one estimate put it at almost half of total 
GRP (Vinokurov, 2007, p. 45). The share of outright illegal activities, such as the production and 
distribution of drugs and weapons, smuggling and prostitution, was estimated at 28% of the total 
grey economy. Between 20,000 and 40,000 families were estimated to make a living from illegal 
‘shuttle’ trading of cigarettes and other goods across the Polish and Lithuanian borders (Vinokurov, 
2004, p. 15). According to Candea et al (2009b, p. 25), the territory has ‘gained a reputation as a 




interests.’ Kaliningrad represents an example whereby the costs of the illicit trade, which is not 
actually illegal when conducted within the territory, can be passed onto other jurisdictions in the 
form of the lost revenue and greater cigarette consumption that result from the sale of untaxed 
cigarettes within their borders. 
The Jebel Ali Free Trade Zone in Dubai presents another example of cigarette production within a 
zone. Instituted in 1985, the zone now hosts 5,000 companies from around the world and operates 
primarily as a re-export hub (Keshavarzian, 2010, p. 272). Evidence suggests that Jebel Ali has been a 
major transit point for illicitly traded cigarettes in various regions. For example, UNODC (2009, p. 27-
30) reports that most of the illicit cigarettes entering West Africa are sourced from FTZs, particularly 
Jebel Ali. It also identifies zones in the United Arab Emirates, and Jebel Ali in particular, as the 
second biggest source of counterfeit goods seized at the borders of the EU (UNODC, 2010, p. 179). 
While the product itself travels via Jebel Ali and/or other zones, the UNODC (2009, p. 29) notes that 
the companies organising the trade ‘are often headquartered in offshore investment centres in 
another part of the world entirely.’  However, in addition to acting as a trans-shipment hub for illicit 
whites produced in Europe, Asia and Paraguay, Jebel Ali itself has become an important 
manufacturing centre (Euromonitor, 2014). More than 80 companies are licensed to trade in and 
manufacture tobacco products in the zone itself (Allen, 2013, p. 12), which contains at least ten 
cigarette factories and a capacity of about 60 billion cigarette sticks a year (Euromonitor, 2014). 
Cheap white brands produced in Jebel Ali are apparently sold illegally worldwide, including in the 
Middle East, Europe and Africa (Euromonitor, 2014; Allen, 2013, p. 12).   
 
The Political Geography of Illicit Trade 
The very nature of illicit trade makes it difficult to conduct accurate, detailed and comprehensive 




illicit trade, some appear to be particularly problematic. The weight of evidence uncovered by 
various agencies, researchers and journalists points to a systemic, rather than coincidental, problem 
with trans-shipment of smuggled goods via free zones. A number of international agencies have 
identified the vulnerability of such zones, not just to tobacco smuggling, but to other forms of 
organised crime. Indeed, the illicit trade in tobacco products is often entwined with other forms of 
crime, including narcotics trafficking, and may play a key role in money laundering schemes. Both 
free zones and other kinds of SEZs may offer opportunities for manufacturing of illicit products.   
The problems of zones may also be exacerbated by the connections that those engaged in illicit 
trade also have with other similar, and sometimes overlapping, types of selectively deregulated 
locality, notably ‘offshore’ financial centres.  According to the UNODC (2009, p. 29), for example, the 
ownership of firms engaged in the production and/or smuggling of illicit tobacco products may be 
‘concealed by a complex network of shell companies, often based in offshore financial centres’. We 
see here the confluence of two varieties of ‘de-territorialised’ processes – that of the production and 
movement of physical goods through selectively deregulated places, separated in their governance 
from the rest of the state to which they belong, and the movement of money via a series of other 
(and sometimes the same) places. While the physical movement of goods via zones is difficult to 
track because of multiple transactions and movements between places and modes of transport, 
ownership may be equally difficult to track as a result of multiple holding companies and the secrecy 
offered by ‘offshore’ financial centres.   
The evidence suggests that some zones serve regional or relatively localised smuggling routes, with 
foreign trade zones in the USA in the 1990s a staging point for smuggling Canadian cigarettes back 
into Canada, and Aruba in the same decade serving as a conduit for smuggling Venezuelan cigarettes 
back into Venezuela. Similarly, cigarettes produced in Kaliningrad appear to be mostly smuggled into 
European countries. Yet this pattern is not universal, with Jebel Ali FTZ appearing to serve as a global 




the first is ‘closed off’. Without a comprehensive global approach to these weaknesses, any attempt 
to deal with them in one zone while ignoring others is likely to prove ineffective.  It is to these 
questions of selective deregulation, and the problems of re-regulation within a global economy, that 
the article now turns.  
 
A REGULATORY RACE TO THE BOTTOM?  
The susceptibility of SEZs to illicit trade is the result of an incessant search for competitiveness 
within the global economy and the dominance of a neo-liberal political-economic paradigm. 
Graduated sovereignty, as seen in the development of SEZs, is based on selective exceptions to 
governance mechanisms that apply in the rest of the country, thus creating spaces for TNCs to 
pursue their economic goals unhindered by the normal regulations (Ong, 2006). In implementing 
such exceptions, SEZs may also create spaces for the operation of criminal enterprises. The barriers 
to effective regulation in SEZs may be both ‘internal’ and/or ‘external’ to the country. The creation 
of the SEZ may itself have been the result of political struggles between different national and 
transnational actors (Park, 2005; Keshavarzian, 2010), and once differential regulation has taken 
place, new interests may be created or allowed to become entrenched which make re-regulation 
more difficult. Zones in each country will be subject to the specific, idiosyncratic, political struggles 
that characterise the particular country. Yet what all will have in common is a search for 
competitiveness within the global market and the incentives and disincentives which that 
engenders. It is the resulting ‘race to the bottom’ that represents the biggest obstacle to the 
effective (re)regulation of SEZs.  
The dysfunctionalities created by free zones in particular are severe enough for corporations and 
business associations themselves to have become aware of them. The WEF, for example, 
acknowledges that despite the benefits of such zones for businesses, they are also ‘at the same time 




p. 5) offers a succinct summary of the process whereby global competition creates a damaging ‘race 
to the bottom’: 
In what is sometimes termed as a “race to the bottom”, FTZs generate reduced trade in 
competitor jurisdictions, which encourages them, in turn, to create FTZs, reducing the 
overall level of transparency and “bureaucracy”, while facilitating crime and tax avoidance in 
those jurisdictions. One result: organised crime groups and counterfeiters use FTZs to move 
illegal products around the world without detection.  
A report by the ICC similarly recognises that free zones are ‘exploited and misused by organised 
crime groups to produce, distribute, and sell counterfeit goods’ (BASCAP, 2013, p. 1). TTCs have also 
acknowledged the role of FTZs in the illicit trade, with BAT, for example, describing them as ‘black 
holes where goods move in with one set of paperwork and out with another, fuelling illicit trade’ 
(BAT, 2009).  
However, the specific interests of business organisations must be recognised when assessing their 
views. Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy (BASCAP), for example, was set up by the 
ICC for the specific purpose of articulating business interests on counterfeiting to governments and 
the media. The WEF’s Global Agenda Council on Organized Crime is concerned to understand the 
effects of organised crime on businesses. These organisations focus on counterfeiting because this is 
the activity most likely to damage businesses, although it is only one aspect of the illicit trade. In the 
specific case of illicit trade in tobacco products, where the smuggling of TTCs’ genuine (untaxed) 
products takes place, the TTCs themselves are likely to gain, since they make their ‘normal’ profit 
from the original sale to distributors, while overall consumption is likely to increase as the result of 
the availability of cheap cigarettes (Joossens and Raw, 1998). Indeed, there is evidence that some 
TTCs were complicit in the smuggling of their own products during the 1990s (Holden, 2016). While 
there is no evidence of direct TTC input into cited ICC or WEF reports, and there is evidence of a shift 




production of counterfeit products and ‘illicit whites’, TTCs may have an incentive to 
disproportionally emphasise this aspect of the illicit trade, since it competes directly with sales of 
their genuine products.  
The growing recognition of the problems of illicit trade via free zones has led to a number or 
recommendations for more effective governance and best practice (FATF, 2010; WEF, 2012; BASCAP, 
2013). Central to most of these is a challenge to a conception of ‘deterritorialisation’ that regards 
the zone as wholly outside the customs territory, so that customs authorities have no control there. 
The WCO’s International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonisation of Customs 
Procedures (the ‘Revised Kyoto Convention’ or RKC) (WCO, 1999) regards goods as outside the 
customs territory only in relation to import duties and taxes. Customs authorities should therefore 
be regarded as empowered to exercise their normal non-tariff functions, such as the unrestricted 
right to enter and observe operations, to audit the books and records of companies in the zone, and 
to undertake border inspections and seizures (BASCAP, 2013). Furthermore, the WCOs’ SAFE 
Framework of Standards (WCO, 2015a), by which accredited ‘authorised economic operators’ 
receive beneficial customs treatment such as fewer or no inspections on imported or exported 
goods, can only operate where customs is empowered to operate fully within a zone.  
However, whether by design or misunderstanding, many governments interpret customs authorities’ 
lack of control over tariffs in zones as lack of control per se, so that there is no effective control over 
goods entering and leaving the zone. As the ICC puts it: ‘These countries operate under the premise 
that goods in FTZs are not clearing through Customs and are not being imported’ (BASCAP, 2013, p. 
3). Furthermore, some countries have regulations empowering customs to control goods entering 
zones, but do not apply these (BASCAP, 2013, p. 3). The current form of the RKC is inadequate to 
deal with this, since the specific provisions on free zones[2], which provide for customs authorities 
to control and check goods entering zones, are contained within a Specific Annex (WCO, 1999: 




Specific Annex D2, its effectiveness will be determined by the extent to which countries have 
adopted its provisions into national law, since the RKC contains no dispute resolution or 
enforcement measures for non-compliance (BASCAP, 2013, p. 15).  
The account of Aruba’s experiences in the FATF (2010) report is illustrative of the problem. While it 
indicates that Aruba has attempted to improve governance of its zone since the 1990s, via 
introduction of better screening of companies and more transparency in transactions, the new FTZ 
regime has had difficulty understanding company ownership structures, which may be opaque, and 
has seen ‘a substantial shift of trade from Aruba to other countries’ (FATF, 2010, p. 41). Aruba’s 
experience indicates a continuing problem in relation to eliminating the ‘race to the bottom’. While 
on the one hand the exploitation of zones by criminal elements potentially impacts every jurisdiction 
in the world, regardless of whether a country has a zone or not (FATF, 2010, p 28), on the other 
hand, and similar to the case of ‘offshore’ financial services regulation, there are clear competitive 
advantages to non-compliance with best practice (FATF, 2010, p. 44). As Aruba’s experience 
indicates, unless all parties regulate effectively, ‘the FTZ which is regulated will lose clients and 
volume of the business in favour of other FTZs which are not regulated… Integrity has a price and 
generates a cost which can have consequences on volume of business in zones in terms of 
competitiveness… The competitive advantage of non-compliance needs to be dealt with, a level 
playing field needs to be guaranteed.’ (FATF, 2010, p. 44). A global approach encompassing all zones 
is therefore required. Yet it is a measure of the extent of the problem that, as of 9th November 2015, 
only 21 of 103 Contracting Parties to the RKC had acceded to Specific Annex D2 (and five of those 
with reservations) (WCO, 2015b).  
Aside from the RKC, the international treaty most relevant to the illicit trade in tobacco products is 
the WHO Protocol. Article 12 of the Protocol (WHO, 2013) requires States Parties to implement, 
within three years of the entry into force of the Protocol for that Party, ‘effective controls on all 




relevant measures’. It prohibits ‘the intermingling’ of tobacco products with non-tobacco products in 
a single container at the time of removal from a zone. Other than the specific provisions applying to 
free zones, the Protocol’s most important provisions, which Article 12 indicates should apply also to 
free zones, are those dealing with supply chain control, including the implementation of a tracking 
and tracing regime. As Sou and Preece (2013) argue, to be effective these provisions will require 
standardised regional and global systems, and effective collaboration between various agencies, 
particularly the WHO and the WCO at the global level. If any jurisdiction does not implement the 
tracking and tracing regime to a consistent standard, there will be a ‘break’ in the system ‘leaving all 
other countries linked to a global system without vital information’ (Sou and Preece, 2013, p. 80). At 
the time of writing, however, only 13 States Parties had ratified or acceded to the Protocol, which 
will only come into force 90 days after ratification by the 40th Party.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The uniform management of territory by modern states has given way to a more spatially selective 
form of territorial governance – ‘graduated sovereignty’ - in which some slices of territory are more 
fully integrated into the world economy than others via various forms of differential regulation.  
Illicit trade in tobacco products via SEZs takes two main forms, which may overlap: smuggling, 
primarily taking advantage of inadequately supervised trans-shipment in free zones, and 
manufacturing within zones themselves. While some zones have been identified as particularly 
problematic, the diversity of SEZs and the mutability of smuggling routes make it difficult to identify 
which zones are utilised, since the exploitation of such zones may not be stable over time. It is also 
this flexibility that makes it difficult to combat the illicit trade, except through a generalised re-
regulation of customs procedures. Smuggling routes are complex and open to adaptation in 
response to changes in regulation, customs or police activity in any particular jurisdiction. A 




Furthermore, one form of selective deterritorialisation – the differential customs procedures applied 
to the movement of material goods – may be allied with another – the use of ‘offshore’ financial 
centres to move money and obscure the true nature of transactions and their beneficiaries.  
The discussion presented here confirms Ong’s (2000; 2006) theorisation of graduated sovereignty 
and draws attention to the multiplicity of forms that this can give rise to, evident in both the many 
kinds of SEZ that exist, in the proliferation of ‘offshore’ financial centres, and in the links between 
these. Greater research is needed into such forms and their interpenetration. The allying of Ong’s 
concept of graduated sovereignty with Agnew’s (2009) use of the concept of infrastructural power 
may be fruitful in this regard. These forms of graduated sovereignty have been engendered in large 
part as a result of neoliberal forms of global competition, demonstrating the link between 
globalisation processes and current adaptations in the forms of state sovereignty. In this respect, 
Agnew (2009, p. 207) has argued that ‘Infrastructural power in particular can be extended over 
space at a distance’, giving currency regimes as an example. However, SEZs demonstrate that states 
can also provide infrastructure selectively within a particular slice of their territory, but make it 
available only to external actors, in this case TNCs but also, unwittingly, transnational criminal 
networks. So while, as Agnew further argues (2009, p. 111), sovereignty ‘is divisible across different 
areas’ such as the economy and security, we find that in SEZs the selective loosening of economic 
regulation has unintended negative consequences for security. As Chalfin (2006, p. 253) notes, the 
‘state’s role in the spatialization of power is not reduced or replaced by globalization but thoroughly 
tied to and in many ways productive of the ordering of the global market… an example of the 
generation of the transnational through the tactics of the state.’ Yet in SEZs, states’ attempts to build 
markets and attract capital can become dysfunctional, as they permit the access of criminal 
organisations to the infrastructure of global trade. 
The search for competitive advantage within a liberalised world economy has thus resulted in 




environments that zones can facilitate may have negative effects for other countries and for the 
world economy as a whole, not just for the country where they happen to be situated. While in 
principle governments retain the ability to effectively regulate their own territories, different states 
and jurisdictions may have different capacities or incentives to respond to the problem. In 
Kaliningrad, for example, where cigarettes appear to be legally produced for the sole purpose of 
illicit trade in other jurisdictions, we see how the costs arising from governance gaps may be treated 
as problems which can be passed onto others. Once in train, the process of selective deregulation 
creates a competitive ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of the capacity to cope with organised crime, just 
as it may do in terms of social standards, a problem that can only ultimately be overcome by 
international negotiation and agreement. SEZs and ‘offshore’ finance, both of which are implicated 
in the illicit trade in tobacco products, are forms of selective deterritorialisation that may need to be 
at least partially reversed – ‘reterritorialised’ - if the gaps in global governance are to be closed.  
 
ENDNOTES 
1. Some authors may use a different typology or nomenclature when discussing zones. This article 
follows the World Bank’s typology, referring to SEZs when discussing zones in general and to FTZs or 
‘free zones’ when referring specifically to that type of zone, or when a cited source refers specifically 
to FTZs. 
2. ‘Free zones’ in the RKC are defined as ‘a part of the territory of a Contracting Party where any 
goods introduced are generally regarded, insofar as import duties and taxes are concerned, as being 








Agnew, J. (1994). The territorial trap: The geographical assumptions of international relations theory. 
Review of International Political Economy, 1(1), 53-80.  
Agnew, J. (2009). Globalization and sovereignty. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.  
Allen, E. (2013). The illicit trade in tobacco products and how to tackle it, Second Edition, 
International Tax and Investment Centre. Available at: http://www.iticnet.org/images/AIT/English-
TheIllicitTradeinTobaccoProductsandHowtoTackleIt.pdf. Accessed 24.11.15.  
Asia Sentinel (2012). Philippines free trade zones a smuggling haven. Asia Sentinel, 11.4.12. Available 
at: http://www.asiasentinel.com/society/philippines-free-trade-zones-a-smuggling-haven/, Accessed 
11.11.15.  
BASCAP (2013). Controlling the zone: Balancing facilitation and control to combat illicit trade in the 
world’s free trade zones. Paris: Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy/International 
Chamber of Commerce.  
BAT (2009). British American Tobacco supports WHO fight against illicit trade, News Release, 
29.6.09. Available at: 
http://www.bata.com.au/group/sites/UK__9D9KCY.nsf/vwPagesWebLive/DO7TDEQD?opendocume
nt&TMP=1, Accessed 5.1.16.  
Bate, R. (2013). Do special enterprise zones undermine capitalism and our safety? Real Clear 
Markets, March 20th, 2013, Available at: 
http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2013/03/20/do_special_enterprise_zones_undermine_c




Beare, M. (2002). Organized corporate criminality: Tobacco smuggling between Canada and the US. 
Crime, law and Social Change, 37, 225-243.  
Beck, U. (2005). World risk society and the changing foundations of transnational politics. In E. 
Grande & L.W. Pauly (Eds.), Complex sovereignty: Reconstituting political authority in the twenty-first 
century (pp. 22-47). Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Beelman, M. (2000). Philip Morris accused of smuggling, money-laundering conspiracy in 
racketeering lawsuit. International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Centre for Public 
Integrity. Available at: http://www.icij.org/node/460/philip-morris-accused-smuggling-money-
laundering-conspiracy-racketeering-lawsuit. Accessed 10.11.15.  
Candea, S., Campbell, D., Lavrov, V. & Shleynov, R. (2009a). Made to be smuggled: Russian 
contraband cigarettes ‘Flooding’ EU. In Tobacco Underground: The Global Trade in Smuggled 
Cigarettes, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists Digital Newsbook, Available at: 
http://www.icij.org/project/tobacco-underground/ebook-tobacco-underground. (Accessed 15.6.15).  
Candea, S., Campbell, D., Lavrov, V. & Shleynov, R. (2009b). ‘Going undercover: Inside Baltic 
Tobacco’s smuggling empire’. In Tobacco Underground: The Global Trade in Smuggled Cigarettes, 
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists Digital Newsbook, Available at: 
http://www.icij.org/project/tobacco-underground/ebook-tobacco-underground. (Accessed 15.6.15).  
Cawley, M. (2013). Belize free trade zone emerges as cigarette smuggling hub. Insight Crime, 
10.6.13. Available at: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/belize-free-trade-zone-cigarette-
smuggling-hub, Accessed 11.11.15.  
Cerny, P. (1998). Neomedievalism, civil war and the new security dilemma: Globalisation as durable 




Cerny, P. (2010a). Rethinking world politics: A theory of transnational neopluralism. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
Cerny, P. (2010b). The competition state today: From raison d’Etat to raison du Monde. Policy 
Studies, 31(1), 5-21.  
Chalfin, B. (2006). Global customs regimes and the traffic in sovereignty. Current Anthropology, 
47(2), 243-262.  
Chaloupka, F.J., Hu, T., Warner, K.E., Jacobs, R., & Yurekli, A. (2000). The taxation of tobacco 
products. In P. Jha & F. Chaloupka (Eds.), Tobacco control in developing countries (pp. 237-272). 
Washington DC: World Bank. 
CIA (2015). The world factbook: Panama. Central Intelligence Agency, Available at: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pm.html, Accessed 25.11.15.  
Collin, J., LeGresley, E., MacKenzie, R., Lawrence, S. & Lee, K. (2004). Complicity in contraband:  
British American Tobacco and cigarette smuggling in Asia. Tobacco Control, 13 (Supplement II),  
ii104-ii111.   
Doucette, J. and Lee, S. O. (2015). Experimental territoriality: Assembling the Kaesong Industrial 
Complex in North Korea. Political Geography, 47, 53-63.  
Easterling, K. (2014). Extrastatecraft: The power of infrastructure space. London: Verso.  
Euromonitor (2013). Passport: Illicit trade in tobacco products 2012. Euromonitor International, 
December 2013. 





European Commission (2011). Action plan to fight against smuggling of cigarettes and alcohol along 
the EU eastern border. Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC (2011) 791 Final, 24.6.11, Brussels: 
European Commission.  
Farole, T. (2011). Special economic zones: What have we learned? Washington D.C.: World Bank.  
FATF (2010). Money laundering vulnerabilities of free trade zones. Paris: Financial Action Task 
Force/Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
Friman, H.R., & Andreas, P. (1999). Introduction: International relations and the illicit global 
economy. In H.R. Friman & P. Andreas (Eds.), The illicit global economy and state power (pp. 1-23). 
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.  
Gillespie, K. (2003). Smuggling and the global firm. Journal of International Management, 9, 317-333.  
Glassman, J. (1999). State power beyond the ‘territorial trap’: The internationalisation of the state. 
Political Geography, 18, 669-696.  
Grande, E. and Pauly, L.W. (2005). Complex sovereignty and the emergence of transnational 
authority. In E. Grande & L.W. Pauly (Eds.), Complex sovereignty: Reconstituting political authority in 
the twenty-first century (pp. 285-299). Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Harding, L. (2016). What are the Panama Papers? A guide to history’s biggest data leak. The 
Guardian, 5th April 2016. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/03/what-you-
need-to-know-about-the-panama-papers?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other (Accessed 1.8.16).  
Hirst, P., & Thompson, G. (1999). Globalisation in question (2nd Ed.). Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Holden, C. (2016). Transnational tobacco companies and the moral economy of cigarette smuggling. 





Holden, C., Lee, K., Fooks, G. & Wander, N. (2010). The impact of regional trade integration on firm 
organisation and strategy: British American Tobacco in the Andean Pact. Business and Politics, 12(4), 
Article 3.  
Hudson, R. (2010). Terrorist and organised crime groups in the Tri-Border Area of South America. 
Washington DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. 
IMF (2014). Panama: Detailed assessment report – FATF recommendations for anti-money 
laundering and combating the financing of terrorism. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.  
Jones, M. R. (1997). Spatial selectivity of the state? The regulationist enigma and local struggles over 
economic governance. Environment and Planning A, 29(5), 831 – 864.  
Joossens, L., Chaloupka, F.J., Merriman, D., & Yurekli, A. (2000). Issues in the smuggling of tobacco 
products. In P. Jha & F. Chaloupka (Eds.), Tobacco control in developing countries (pp. 393-406). 
Washington DC: World Bank.  
Joossens, L., Merriman, D., Ross,H. & Raw,M. (2010). The impact of eliminating the global illicit 
cigarette trade on health and revenue. Addiction, 105(9), 1640-1649.  
Joosens, L., & Raw, M. (1998). Cigarette smuggling in Europe: Who really benefits? Tobacco Control, 
7, 66-71.  
Joossens, L. & Raw, M. (2012). From cigarette smuggling to illicit tobacco trade. Tobacco Control, 21, 
230-234.  
Keating, M. (2001). Nations against the state: The new politics of nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia 
and Scotland (2nd Ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave.  
Keshavarzian, A. (2010). Geopolitics and the genealogy of free trade zones in the Persian Gulf. 




Lawrence, J. (2015). Why Panama remains a money laundering haven. Insight Crime, 14th September 
2015, Available at: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/why-panama-remains-a-money-
laundering-haven, Accessed 25.11.15.  
Lee, K. & Collin, J. (2006). ‘Key to the future’: British American Tobacco and cigarette smuggling in 
China. PLOS Medicine, 3(7), e228.  
LeGresley, E., Lee, K., Muggli, M.E., Patel,P., Collin,J. & Hurt, R.D. (2008). British American Tobacco 
and the ‘insidious impact of illicit trade’ in cigarettes across Africa. Tobacco Control, 17, 339-346.  
Levien, M. (2011). Special economic zones and accumulation by dispossession in India. Journal of 
Agrarian Change, (11)4, 454-83.  
MacKenzie, R. & Holden, C. (2016). Analysing corporate documents. In K. Lee & B. Hawkins (Eds.), 
Researching corporations and global health governance: An interdisciplinary guide (pp. 180-201). 
London: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Mann, M. (1984). The autonomous power of the state: Its origins, mechanisms and results. European 
Journal of Sociology, 25(2), 185-213.  
Marsden, W., Beelman, M., Birnbauer, B., Campbell, D., Schelzig, E.J. & Sisti, L. (2001). Tobacco 
companies linked to criminal organisations in lucrative cigarette smuggling. International 
Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Centre for Public Integrity. Available at: 
http://www.icij.org/node/460/tobacco-companies-linked-criminal-organizations-lucrative-cigarette-
smuggling. Accessed 10.11.15. 
McCallum, J.K. (2011). Export processing zones: Comparative data from China, Honduras, Nicaragua 




Merriman, D., Yurekli, A., & Chaloupka, F.J. (2000). How big is the worldwide cigarette smuggling 
problem? In P. Jha & F. Chaloupka (Eds.), Tobacco control in developing countries (pp. 237-272). 
Washington DC: World Bank.  
Ngai, P. (2004). Women workers and precarious employment in Shenzhen special economic zone, 
China. Gender & Development, (12)2, 29-36. 
Nordstrom, C. (2000). Shadows and sovereigns. Theory, Culture & Society, 17(4), 35-54. 
OECD (2008). The economic impact of counterfeiting and piracy. Paris: Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development.  
Ong, A. (2000). Graduated sovereignty in South East Asia. Theory, Culture & Society, 17(4), 55-75.  
Ong, A. (2006). Neoliberalism as exception: Mutations in citizenship and sovereignty. London: Duke 
University Press.  
Park, B. (2005). Spatially selective liberalisation and graduated sovereignty: Politics of neo-liberalism 
and ‘special economic zones’ in South Korea. Political Geography, 24, 850-873.  
Pauly, L.W. & Grande, E. (2005). Reconstituting political authority: Sovereignty, effectiveness, and 
legitimacy in a transnational order. In E. Grande & L.W. Pauly (Eds.), Complex sovereignty: 
Reconstituting political authority in the twenty-first century (pp. 3-21). Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press.  
Peck, J. & Tickell, A. (1994). Jungle law breaks out: Neoliberalism and global-local disorder. Area, 
26(4), 317-326.  
Ronderos, M.T. (2001). In Latin America, big tobacco partners with money launderers, smugglers. 
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Centre for Public Integrity. Available at: 
http://www.icij.org/node/460/latin-america-big-tobacco-partners-money-launderers-smugglers.  




Ruggie, J.G. (1993). Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations. 
International Organization, 47(1), 139-174.   
Shieh, S. (2005). The rise of collective corruption in China: The Xiamen smuggling case. Journal of 
Contemporary China, 14(42), 67-91.  
Sidaway, J.D. (2007a). Spaces of postdevelopment. Progress in Human Geography, 31(3), 345-361.  
Sidaway, J.D. (2007b). Enclave space: A new metageography of development? Area, 39(3), 331-339.  
Sigler, T.J. (2014). Panama’s special economic zones: Balancing growth and development. Bulletin of 
Latin American Research, 33(1), 1-15.  
Sou, G. & Preece, R. (2013). Reducing the iIlicit trade in tobacco products in the ASEAN region: A 
review of the protocol to eliminate illicit trade in tobacco products. World Customs Journal, 7(2), 65-
91.  
UNODC (2009). Transnational trafficking and the rule of law in West Africa: A threat assessment. 
Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 
UNODC (2010). The globalisation of crime: A transnational organized crime threat assessment. 
Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 
Vinokurov, E. (2004). Economic prospects for Kaliningrad: Between EU enlargement and Russia’s 
integration into the world economy. CEPS Working Document No. 201, Brussels: Centre for European 
Policy Studies. 
Vinokurov, E. (2007). Kaliningrad: Enclaves and economic integration. Brussels: Centre for European 
Policy Studies. 
Walker, N. (1998). Sovereignty and differentiated integration in the European Union. European Law 




Watts, R.L. (1998). Federalism, federal political systems, and federations. Annual Review of Political 
Science, 1, 117-137.  
WCO (1999). International convention on the simplification and harmonisation of customs 
procedures (revised). Brussels: World Customs Organisation.  
WCO (2013). Illicit trade report 2012. Brussels: World Customs Organisation.  
WCO (2015a). SAFE framework of standards to secure and facilitate global trade. Brussels: World 
Customs Organisation.  
WCO (2015b). Position as regards ratifications and accessions: International convention on the 
simplification and harmonisation of customs procedures (as amended). Brussels: World Customs 
Organisation. Available at: http://www.wcoomd.org/en/about-us/legal-
instruments/~/media/B14C72DBCEFF4BDD94BEC5F8B4B3B7DF.ashx, Accessed 13.1.16.  
WEF (2012). Organised crime enablers. Geneva: World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on 
Organized Crime.  
WHO (2013). Protocol to eliminate illicit trade in tobacco products. Geneva: World Health 
Organisation.   
WHO (2005). WHO framework convention on tobacco control. Geneva: World Health Organisation.  
World Bank (2008). Special economic zones: Performance, lessons learned, and implications for zone 
development. Washington DC: The World Bank. 
WTO (2014). Trade policy review: Report by the secretariat: Panama. Geneva: World Trade 





Yurekli, A., & Sayginsoy, O. (2010). Worldwide organized cigarette smuggling: An empirical analysis. 
Applied Economics, 42, 545-561.  
ZEC (2015). Canary Islands Special Zone. Available at: http://www.zec.org/en/, Accessed 25.11.15.  
Zhang, J. (2012). From Hong Kong’s capitalist fundamentals to Singapore’s authoritarian governance: 
The policy mobility of neo-liberalising Shenzhen, China. Urban Studies, 49(13), 2853-2871.  
 
